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JURISDICTION:

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter

pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(d). This case should be addressed by
the

Supreme Court because:

1) it deals with improprieties on the

part of the Defendant's lawyers;
of the Trial Court judge:

3)

2) it deals with bias on the part

it deals with issues of first impression

in the state and each issue is of substantial importance in the administration of justice in Utah.

Re: Utah R. App„ P. Rule 9 (c7B);

ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Plaintiff (Theresa F. Thompson)

requests that the whole case be reviewed with careful attention to:

1)

whether or not Defendant's lawyers informed Defendant that false testamony
to the EEOC would be protected by absolute privilege.

(The Defendant

knew about absolute privilege and used it in planning its response to the
EEOC and violated all laws against false testamony both State and Federal.
The ease with which the testamony can be proven false and the fact that
it was admitted at the hearing indicates a prior knowledge of protection
through absolute privilege.
Deceit

and Collusion);

(Standard of Review—Section 78-51-31—

2) whether or not Defendant's defensive

arguments apply to the Plaintiff's charges or to charges created by
Defendant with atatements life:
to do is..."

"What Plaintiff is really attempting

(Standard of Review—Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (a 1, 4)

and Section 78-51-26(4)—Duties of Attorneys and Counselors...to employ
for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided to him such means
only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the
judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law; 3) whether or
not the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can be determined to be
quasi-judicial according *-^ Utah Code.
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(Standard of Review—Comparison

of regulations governing EEOC officials and procedures with Utah
Codes governing judges, lawyers, procedures and quasi-judicial officials
(court commissioners); 4) whether or not absolute privilege can be
claimed if the statements made in a potentially quasi-judicial proceeding
have nothing to do with duty and in no way promote public welfare (both
requirements by definition), (Standard of Review—Black's Law Dictionary);
5) whether common law (absolute privilege) in violation of statutory
law (laws against false testimony) takes precedence over statutory law
or whether statutory law takes precedence over common law.

(Standard of

Review—Utah R. App. P. Rule 9(c7B).
Issues 1 and 2 above are intrinsic to the manner in which the trial court
case was conducted and to the information presented to the EEOC in the course
of an official proceeding.

The misconduct and criminal behavior of Mr. O'Brien

will be proven in the argument section of this brief.

The intrinsic nature

of this issues is preserved in the trial court records.

Issues 3, 4 and 5

are matters of law that need to be determined for fair administration of law
and are matters that need to be determined by the Supreme Court.
are basic to the determination of the trial court case.

5

These matters

6.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL:

Constitution of Utah, Article 1, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,

Sec. 15. Freedom

of speech and of the press—Libels
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech
or of the press.

In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth

may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the
jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, tne party shall be
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law
and the fact.
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE:
Section 76-8-502:

A person is guilty of a felony of the second

degree if in any official proceeding;

1) He makes a false material

statement under oath or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth
of a material statement previously made and he does not believe the
statement to be true; or 2)

He makes inconsistent material statements

under oath or affirmation, both within the period of limitations,
one of which is false and not believed by him to be true.

In a

prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or proved
which of the statements is false but only that one or the other was
false and not believed by the defendant to be true.

(False or in-

consistent material statements^
76-8-503.

False or inconsistent statements. A person is guilty of

a class B misdemeanor if:

1) He makes a false statement under oath

or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of the statement previously made and he does not believe the statement to be true if:
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(a)

The falsification occurs in an official proceeding, or is made

with a purpose to mislead a public servant in performing his official
functions; or (b)

The statement is one which is required by law to

be sworn or affirmed before a notoary or other person authorized to
administer oaths; or (2)

He makes inconsistent statements under oath

or affirmation, both within the period of limitations, one of which
is false and not believed by him to be true.

In a prosecution

under this section, it need not be alleged or proved which of the
statements is false but only that one or the other was false and
not believed by the defendant to be true.

(3)

No person shall be

guilty under this section if he retracts the falsification before
it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed.
76-8-504.

Written false statement.

B misdemeanor if:

(1)

A person is guilty of a class

He makes a written false statement...(not

applicable to this case) : or (2) with intent to deceive a public
servant in the performance of his official function, he: (a)

Makes

any written false statement which he does not believe to be true:
JUDICIAL CODE:
78-51-31.

Deceit and collusion. An attorney and counselor who is

guitly of deceit or collusion, or who sonsents thereto, with intent
to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or proceeding
is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured party
treble damages to be recovered in a civil action.
78-3-31.

Court

commissioners—Qualifications—appointment—

Functions governed by rule.

(1) (a)

Court commissioners are quasi-

judicial officers of courts of record and have judicial authority
as provided by this section and rules of the Judicial Council,
(b)

(must be lawyers but may not practice law during tenure as

7

Court commissioners—Section 78-7-2); (2) (a) (appointed by
Judicial Council with concurrence of majority of judges of trial
courts in the district commissioner will primarily serve.);
(qualifications);
shall:

(4) (oath of office); (5)

(3)

Court commissioners

(a) comply with applicable constitutional and statutory

provisions, court rules and procedures, and rules of the Judicial
Council;

(b) comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct to the same

extent as full-time judges; and (c) successfully complete orientation
and education programs as required by the Judicial Council.
(6)

(what functions commissioner may and may not perform);

(7) The presiding judge of the district the commissioner primarily
serves:

(a) shall develop a performance plan for the court commis-

sioner and annually conduct an evaluation of the commissioner's
performance, and shall provide the plan and evaluations to the
judicial Council upon request; and (b) is responsible for the dayto-day supervision of the court commissioner.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
Rule 1. General provisions . (a) Scope of rules

They shall be

liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.
Part III

PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS, (summary of the presentation

of a case to a court—complaint, answer, motions with memorandum
in support of motion, and counter-motions with memorandum in support of such motions, possible hearings and requests for decisions.)
(Every action is an attempt to get to the truth of the matter and
every party has the right to address every issue that is brought up)
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT:
CANON I.

A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE
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OF THE JUDICIARY.

An independent and honorable judiciary is in-

dispensable to justice in our society.

A judge should participate

in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and shall personally
observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.

The provisions of

this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective.
CANONS 2-5

(summary—judges shall avoid impropriety and the

appearance of impropriety in all activities, shall perform the duties
of the office impartially and diligently and shall do nothing that
might make anyone lose faith in the judicial system, shall so conduct
the judge's extra-judicial activities as to minimize the risk of
conflict with judicial obligations,

and shall refrain from political

activity inappropriate to the judicial office.)
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
Scope. The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason.
They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal
representation and of the law itself,

(summary of rules—the rules

control client-lawyer relationships, the role of counselor,
advocate with many shall nots such as shall not deliberately mislead a tribunal, transactions with persons other than clients,
public service, etc.
to:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer

(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional

Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another;)
42 U.S.C.A.section 2000e-9
1.

Purpose:

(Re: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)

In amending this subchapter to give Commission

authority to conduct investigations of charges of employment
discrimination and to enforce orders where it was determined
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that discrimination existed, Congress intended to simplify investigations,
rather than complicate them with protracted pleadings and motions, in order
to remove burdens that had been placed upon both courts and parties.

EEOC

V. Suburban Transit System, Inc. N. D. Ill 1982, 538 F. Supp. 530.

****************************************************

Definition of absolute privilege from Black's Law Dictionarty:
An exemption from liability for the speaking

( libelous statements)

in the performance of a duty...(absolute) privilege...protects the
speaker or publisher without reference to his motives or the truth
or falsity of statement.

This may be claimed in respect to state-

ments made in legislative debates, in reports of military officers
to their superiors in the line of duty and statements made by judges,
witnesses, and jurors in trials in court...based on the fact that
the statement was made in the performance of a political, judicial,
social or personal duty...privileges created by law irrespective of
consent...arise where there is some important overriding social
value in sanctioning defendant's conduct, despite the fact that it
causes plaintiff harm,
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7.

A STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Plaintiff received 2 years of harrassment by Community Nursing Service,

was fired, and filed a complaint with the EEOC because of harrassment and
retaliation.

The Defendant presented false testimony to the EEOC in violation

of the law, and the Plaintiff having no way to anticipate this action on the
part of her former employers was thrown into severe stress that sent Plaintiff
to Logan Regional hospital with intractible abdoemenal pain and migraine
headache for 9 days followed by 3 week recovery period*

I filed a civil

suit for severe physical and emotional stress for false testimony.

The false

testimony is described in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Complaint, but I labeled
it as defamation for brevity's sake when I referred to it elsewhere believing
that when you presented false testimony against some one you are defaming
them, (page 3)
CNS/H's defense was that absolute privilege prevented any charges from
being brought against them, (page 136)
Judge J. Dennis Frederick agreed.
Mr. O'Brien (CNS/H's lawyer) continuously tried to deceive and mislead
the judge through lies (telling the judge the essential issue filed with
the EEOC was termination (page 42) when the essential issue filed with EEOC
was clearly a two-year history of harrassment (pages 67-73)) and half truths
(page 38)/

0 c;ear;u cjarged tjat 0 was severely harmed mentally and physically

by half truths and outright lies

(page 3 ) . I want the case reviewed for mis-

conduct on the part of Mr. O'Brien leading to defenses that did not apply to
some of my charges.
Judge Fredericks conduct during the hearing was a violation of Rules of
Judicial Conduct (pages 187-189).

He made a decision on an untimely motion

by Defendant, signed an order before Plaintiff knew about the motion, rescinded
the order upon objection from Plaintiff, then reaffirmed it without further
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information from Defendant,

(page 134—untimely motion, page 141—hasty

decision, page 148-9—order signed by judge with signature erased, page 150—
order setting aside hasty decision—please note #1—the reason it was set
aside, page 154—reaffirmed the hasty decision with no new information from
defendant*)

Plaintiff contends that this indicates bias on part of judge.

Plaintiff further contends that the criterion upon which the EEOC is
determined to be a quasi-judicial body is arbitrary and that there are no
regulations in place controlling the use of its powers to insure or attempt
to insure a just and fair decision by the EEOC.

The result is a statement

that truthful or false testimony is protected by absolute privilege (page 39)
When a decision is based on false testimony, the decision has to be unjust.
It is for this court to decide whether or not justice is served by granting
the status of quasi-judicial to the EEOC.

We are not discussing whether

or not my feelings and reputation were hurt by the Defendant saying bad
but truthful things about me, but whether justice was served by the EEOC
investigation and decision based on false testamony being given to the
EEOC by Defendant in violation of the law.

Was the severe physical and

emotional harm caused by testimony that should never have appeared in the
investigation (which I charged) defamation or an attempt to create a
defamation liability or properly a Tort of Outrage based on false testimony?
Finally this Court needs to decide if absolute privilege creates a right to
present false testimony before an official proceeding to manipulate the
decision of that proceeding..

**************************************************
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8.

Summary of arguments

1.

The EEOC should not be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding or body

based on the current criterion because the current criterion is arbitrary
and has no criterion that insures or attempts to insure a fair and just
determination.

In the current status

of the EEOC, absolute privilege creates

a right to present false testimony to manipulate an official decision and
mislead the investigators.
decided this was so.

At least the judge at the trial court level

A better criterion would be a comparison of judicial

procedures and regulations with similar characteristics of an EEOC investigation.

This is so because judicial procedures and regulations attempt to

insure a fair opportunity to all participants to address all issues in order
that a fair and equitable decision can be made by the judiciary.
2.

Absolute privilege cannot protect false testimony from defamation, criminal

or tort of outrage charges.
I, Section 15.

According to the Utah State Constitution, Article

Statements that are libelous must also be truthful, published

with good motives and for justifiable ends in order for the person guilty to
be acquited.

Even though Judge Frederick found in Defendant's favor, Mr.

O'Brien never proved that absolute privilege protected false testimony as
will be shown in the arguments.
3.

Plaintiff contends that Mr. O'Brien is guilty of deceit and collusion

and misconduct throughout these proceedings.

The easei with which the

testimony can be proven false and contradictory indicates a prior knowledge
or belief in immunity from prosecution.
came from Mr. O'Brien.

Plaintiff contends that the knowledge

Also Mr. O'Brien has consistently and continually

attempted to deceive and mislead the trial court as to what the charges were*
rules, procedures, definitions and has applied defenses that do not apply to
charges as will be shown in the body of the argument.
4.

Judge Frederick was biased against the Plaintiff as evidenced by his
13

behavior and attitude towards Plaintiff at the hearing (pages 187-190)
and his handling of some post-judgment motions and papers
described in the body of the argument, (pages 134, 141, 143, 148, 149, 150,
154),

****************************************************************************
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ARGUMENTS
!o

Argument against Equal Employment Opportunity Commission being granted

quasi-judicial status and absolute privilege of statements made in its investigations .
In Thomas v. Petrulis (465 N.E. 2d 1059 111. App. 2 pist. 1984)

Six

powers are listed as differentiating a quasi-judicial body from that performing merely an administrative function (page 51):
1)

the power to exercise

judgment and discretion;

2)

the power to

hear and determine determine or to ascertain facts and decide;
power to make binding orders and judgments:

4)

3)

the

the power to affect

the personal or property rights of private persons;

5)

the power to

examine witnesses, to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to hear
the litigation of the issues on a hearing'

and 6)

the power to enforce

decisions or impose penalties.
Plaintiff would like to point out that among these six powers is not
one characteristic, element or power that does anything to insure or attempt
to insure a fair and just determination.

There is nothing here to guarantee

that the investigator does try to use discretion, or ascertain fact from
falsity, or that a witness will be examined rather than the passive recording
of testimony without challenge to its veracity or allowing its veracity to
be challenged.
These powers without regulations to insure a fair and equitable decision
leads to statements like:

"Thus assuming arguendo (for the purpose of

this motion only) that the factual basis of her claim is true, (1.

severe

physical and emotional harm caused by false testimony, 2. defamation of
character—added by Plaintiff)

Plaintiff plainly seeks to impose defamation

liability for statements that are absolutely privileged because they were
allegedly made during the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding."
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(page 39) and "Of course an absolute privilege means there is no cause of
action regardless of whether the statement at issue is true or false."
(Page 42)
But the Utah State Constitution Article I, section 15 says it does
make a difference * Article 15 says: No law shall be passed to abridge or
restrain the freedom of speech or of the press.

In all criminal prosecutions

for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquited:

and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the

fact.
None of these were met by CNS/Hfs statements to the EEOC.

They presented

false testimony, without good faith and for the purpose of manipulating an
official commission in the performance of duty.

(The proof will be given

under the argument for misconduct of the lawyer.)
The intrinsic falseness and self-contradictory nature of the testimony
is a violation of criminal Code sections 76-8-502, 76-8-503, and 76-8-504.
Inspite of these violations of the State Constitution and statutory laws$
Judge Frederick decided in Defendant's favor, " for reasons specified in supporting memorandum." (page 98)
In conclusion, from the foregoing statements, the basis upon which the
EEOC has been determined to be quasi-judicial is arbitrary and_abrog4tes
any possibitity

of a fair and just decision.

An equally valid but more equitable criterion in that it would insure
or at least attempt to insure a fair and just decision would be to compare
the regulations that control the powers of both the judiciary and the EEOC.
In the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 it says:

Scope of rules...

They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
16
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According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Part III Pleadings, Motions
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address every issue that is brought up.)
Eliminating the pleadi ngs and motions means that all issues will probabbly
not be adtessed'by

everyone which is what happened to Plaintiff

1 was not

allowed to know what information was presented by CNS/H to the EEOC except
i ill I I n
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know that CNS/H had lied
formation was false,
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J i n a i Conduct and Rule:* ^" Professional Conduct.

Code of Judical o < .i^t- ^tato^ th-i

The

indpe shall upheld f.he integrity and

a judge shall and shall not do to uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.

Under the Judicial Code J3~3-31 are listed the qualifications,

appointment and functions of Court Commissioners, quasi-judicial officials
of the Court.

Under 78-3-31 (5a-b)

Court Commissions shall:

comply with

applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, court rules and procedures,
and rules of the Judicial Council:

comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct

to the same extent as full-time judges.
Finally there are the Rules of Professional Conduct which set bounds on
the behavior of lawyers such as Rule 3.3—(a lawyer) shall not deliberately
mislead a tribunal.

All of these Codes and regulations are aimed at fair and

equitable decisions by the Court. There are no such regulations in the EEOC
which is why decisions like I received are made.

To compound the problem,

The EEOC has been improperly classified as quasi-judicial with absolute privilege. When false testimony is classified as defamation and protected by
absolute privilege, there is no possibility of a fair and just decision.
There are three possible solutions based on the information presented,
1)

determine that the EEOC is not quasi-judicial nor is the testimony privi-

leged by anything but the State Constitution;

2)

that the EEOC is quasi-

judicial but that testimony only has partial privilege;

3)

that the EEOC

is quasi-judicial, has absolute privilege, but that false testimony, a violation
of both the State Constitution and statutory law is not, can not and was
never intended to be protected by absolute privilege.
Plaintiff wants any decision that makes Defendant responsible for
their false testimony (a violation of the law) and the severe consequesces to
the Plaintiff.

This charge was not at any time an attempt to create a de-

famation liability regardless of whatever mistakes I made in attempting
to label facts.
The relief Plaintiff asks for the extreme harm caused to her by Defendants
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a political, judicial, social or personal duty...privileges created
by law irrespective of consent...arise where there is some important
orriding social value in sanctioning defendant's conduct, despite
the fact that it causes plaintiff harm.
Obviously, from a comparison of the Utah Constitution Article I Section
15, the statutory laws against false testimony and absolute privilege, there
is a direct conflict.

Absolute privilege abrogates the Constitutional and

statutory provissions that assure justice in an official proceeding.
Absolute privilege is based upon the public interest in according to
all men the utmost freedom of access to the Courts of justice for the settlement of their private disputes."

Restatement (Second) of Torts, section

587-588 (1?77) (hereafter cited as Restatement)

The privilege broadly applies

to any sort of judicial or administrative proceeding, in any branches of
government, where a type of judicial function is performed."

Id. at sec 585.

(page 40)
The purpose is to accord access to the courts of justice with their
rules and regulations to insure justice.

The problems with the broad appli-

cation of absolute privilege is the elimination of justice as described under
argument about the EEOC.
However, is absolute privilege suppose to protect one from the consequences
of violating the law.
Restatement

Plaintiff thinks not.

section 588 states: A witness is absolutely privileged

to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as part of a judicial
proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the
proceeding, (page 40)
According to the State Constitution, these statements must be true,
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends. Also this testimony
will be given under oath where the witness swears to tell the truth.
20

It is

assumed that the testimony although libelous is truthful, not false testimony.
Utah Code Ann., section 45-2-3(2) s t a t e s :

A privileged publication or

broadcast which shal 1, not be considered as libelous or slanderous per
se,

is one m a d e :

(2)

In any publication, or broadcast of or any state-

merit m a d e in any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in an:;) other
official proceeding authorized by law*, (page 4 0 )
This simp 1xi c-^ < t- h M
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In Allen v. Ortez 802 P. 2d 1307 (Utah 1990) (hereafter referred to as
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the Utah Supreme Court relied on both the Restatement Prosseras d i s -
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n
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published 1 with good, motives and for justifiable e n d s , 'Plaintiff

asks the Court to clarify this matter I n thi s d e c i s i o n .

Defendant's lawyer

cited this decision as' support that C N S ? H f s false testimony'had absolute
privilege.)

necessarv

successful < laim or absol.j't- privilege.
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These three elements must also be interpreted in the light of the State
Constitution and statutory laws for the reasons given above.

Again these

elements refer to statements that are truthful, 'published' with good motive
and for justifiable ends. CNS/Hfs testimony did not fit Constitutional
requirements for privilege.

Also there is the added safeguard of all

of the rules and regulations of the judicial system for which the elements
were described for.
In none of the proceeding examples did Mr. O'Brien apply absolute privilege
to quasi-judicial proceedings,

Each example cited was a judicial proceeding

regulated by specific codes and the State Constitution meant to insure a fair
and settlement, and in each situation the testimony is given under oath and
expected and required by law to be truthful, not false testimony.
One quasi-judicial proceeding Mr, O'Brien cited was Thomas v. Petrulis
(465 N.E. 2d 1059 111 App. 2 Dist. 1984) to support his contention that all
testimony before the EEOC is protected by absolute privilege.

In this particulai

case Petrulis' charges with the EEOC are protected by absolute privilege because properly filed charges with the EEOC are protected by statutory law.
(page 48)
What I want to show here is the gross miscarriage of justice when absolute
privilege protects false testimony from defamation liability, and what happens
to the very purpose for which absolute privilege exists.

For the purpose of

argument, we will assume that Petrulis' charges with the EEOC were false and
malicious hnd that Thomas was innocent of any harm.
advances and she wanted to get even.
way to do it.

Perhaps he rebuffed her

The quasi-judicial system is the perfect

Anyone can destroy anyone else in an EEOC investigation.

thing goes and the biggest liar wins.
revenge with the blessings of the law.
disputes to the EEOC?

He lost his job and Petrulis got- her
Is there any reason to take one's

No, since there is no possibility of justice.
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This situation is intolerable.
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Argument for Mr. O'Brien's (Defendant's lawyer) misconduct and liability

of Mr. O'Brien and his employers, JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK AND McDonough Law
Firm
CNS/H presented false testimony to the EEOC in order to manipulate a
decision in their favor.

The ease with which the testimony can be proven

false and the fact that they made no effort to remove inconsistencies indicates knowledge or a belief that they were immuOe to prosecution for
their statements.

Plaintiff contends that that sort of knowledge could only

come from their lawyer.

In advising CNS/H that they could violate Utah Codes

Ann. Sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503, 76-8-504 without fear of proscution, Mr. O'Brien
violated Utah Code Ann. Sec 78-51-31 (Deceit and Collusion—An attorney and
Counselor who is guilty of deceit and collusion, or consents thereto,
with intent to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or proceeding
is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured party treble damages
to be recovered in a civil action-,",

Plaintiff holds Mr. 0'3rien and his

employers liable for Mr. O'Brien's conduct.
Mr. O'Brien also violated several Codes of Professional Conduct as will
be shown.
The following is the account of the false testimony:
Inconsistant

Statement (76-8-503)

See attached sheet—Lona Booth's testimony-

She states:. .'.'she had received many complaints about CP from patients and other
staff, and had counseled CP on these complaints.
CP did a good job."

Except for the complaints,

There were no counseling sessions between Lona Booth and

Plaintiff which is why no such records were sent to the EEOC from Ms. Booth.
The statement:

"Except for the complaints, CP did a good job." is an incon-

sistant statement. A good worker does not get 'many complaints', and one who
gets many complaints is not a good worker.

Please compare with the attached

complaints, none are from Ms. Booth, they are all from Susan Morgan. (Susan
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Morgan was Plaintiff's problem at CNS/H. Please see pages 72-73)
False or inconsistent material statements

Section 76-8-502

(See attached

sheet—testimony from Colleen Hollenbeck) Lines 7, 8 and nine say: "CP struggled with her job duties from the very start of her employment.
problem was the ability to get along with patients."
4 of 'Response to Charge and Request for Information1

Her main

Please refer to Page
paragraph 1.

On or abour December, 1991, (actually it was in May 1992)

It reads:

Ms. Thompson sub-

mitted an internal application requesting she be considered for weekend duty
(actually Plaintiff was hired for weekends and worked every weekend) and
was accepted.

The position was regarded as full-time and was fully benefited.

(I earned about $14 per visit up to 7 visits in a day and $21 for each visit
over 7 in a day.

During 1992 I earned $30,000.

who had problems with clients.
get them.)

A lot of visits for someone

I tried to get my records from CNS/H but couldn't

Skills required of this position included proficiency in IV teaching

and administration, excellence in assessment skills, and organizational skills
to adequately coordinate delivery of care on the weekends...This was the shift
she was working at the time of her termination in March, 19937

Ms. Colleen

Hollenbeck, Director of Nursing in 1991 and 1992, created the weekend position
and offered it to me.

Ms. Hollenbeckfs statement is false and discredited by

fact that she gave me a position that required excellent nursing and people
skills.

Inconsistant Statement (76-8-504), Refer to Page 4 of Response to Charg and
Request for Information:

Paragraph lsays I was given a job on or around December,

1991 (less than a year after I was hired, the position was actually only in
the thinking stage at that time) that required proficiency in...(listed above)
and I still had that same position at the time of my termination.

Paragraph 5

says Plaintiff had a history of staff and patient complaints for which Plaintiff
counseled.

(These complaints are enclosed)
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5/3/91—patient complaint (before

Plaintiff was assigned the newly formed weekend position,

apparantly Plaintifffs

patient skills had improved by the end of 1991.)

Patient complained

1/29/92

of a stressful visit—patient upset because Plaintiff showed at beginning
of yearly championship football game,

(see attached sheet 1/30/92). 4/11/91

(see letter in charge file attached to Objection to Defendant's Motion—pages
72-73)Plaintiff was hired on 1/2/92, was not oriented until end of January,
got so few visits over next few months had to take a second job.

It is to be

assumed Plaintiff would need to increase knowledge of home health necessary
in personal practice.
knowledge.

Obviously, from paragraph 1, Plaintiff acquired that

8/20/92 indicated she needed to "increase assessment skills and

admit paperwork:.

The evaluation that this was on was not sent to the EEOC.

Plaintiff still held weekend position and had excellent skills.

Paragraph 6

says "One of her supervisors, Susan Morgan, has record of verbal counseling
for patient conplaints, interactions with peers and personal appearance issues
on 5/3/91, 10,23/91, 12/1/91, 1/1/92, 1/30/12 and 4/18/92.

Please read Plain-

tiff's charges to the EEOC against CNS/H and see where Susan Morgan fits into
it. (pages 72-73)

Susan Morgan withheld the order mentioned in the Memorandum

in Support of Motion to Reverse Judgment.

5/3/91 has already been discussed.

10/23/91 says one nurse thought I had done something wrong,
done what I was suppose*, to do. Document enclosed.
saw a patient...charting—assessment much better.

Susan said I had

12/1/91 says Teri Thompson
Document enclosed.

1/1/92

says a medication error had been made because of orders Plaintiff received
from another nurse.
enclosed.

Document enclosed.

1/30/92 has been discussed.

4/18/92 speaks again of a stressfull visit.

patient's caregiver was stressed.

Document

Susan thought that the

Of the documents sent in support of Para-

graph 6, 2 dealt with patient conplaints, (both before I was given the weekend position), 2 complaints in two years do not make many complaints, none
address personal appearance of Plaintiff except one written by Susan Morgan
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but unsigned, its enclosed.

One was a complement, one explained a situation

to Plaintiff's benefit and one had to do with a medication error.

The in-

consistency between Paragraph 6 and the documents are a violation of law.
I contend that the ease with which this testimony is proven false indicates a prior knowledge of immunity to prosecution and that that knowledge
could only come from the Defendant's lawyer.
Mr. O'Brien (Defendant's lawyer) has continuously attempted to subvert
and change Plaintiff/Appellantfs charges and mislead and deceive the judge as
to the issues. Plaintiff's Complaint for Severe Financial Loss and Severe
Emotional and Physical Stress for:

Defamation of Personal and Professional

Character. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of this document read:

"9. On or around

the 15th of August, 1994, Sharon Hencky, investigator for the EEOC contacted
Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's charges of:
uncaring, dangerous manner;
ation;
10.

4)

2)

1) treating client in an

filthy, unkemp appearance;

substandard performance;

3)

insubordin-

5) poor interpersonal relationships.

Since Plaintiff had not heard these charges or the half truths or out-

right lies that had been used to support these charges before,

Plaintiff

was thrown into severe emotional stress that ocntributed to an acute episode
of diverticulitis that landed Plaintiff in Logan HOspital for nine days.
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants for defamation of
personal and professional character leading to:
2)

loss of professional reputation;

severe physical and emotional stress;

3)

1)

loss of employment;

loss of personal reputation;

4)

the sum of $3,000,000 (three million

dollars), (page 3)
It is to be assumed that Mr. O'Brien is familiar with the State Constitution and knows that libelous testimony needs to be truthful, published for
good motives and a justifiable end since he is

a lawyer. He deliberately

led Judge Frederick believe that false testimony is protected by privilege,
(page 39,193)
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Memorandum
TO:
File
FROM:
SH
RE:
T. Thompson vs Community Nursing Services
Charge No. 35C-94-0115
A On August 19/ 1994, during a telephone interview# Colleen
2• Hollenbeck (DOB 4-13-59), former Nurse Manager and CP's witness,
£,stated the following:
y. She had hired CP. She stated that the reason CP was hired was her
^1 life's experience, in lieu of the fact she had little nursing
^experience. Ms. Hollenbeck thought that with experience and in7house training, CP would do just fine. CP struggled with h^r job
^.duties from the very start of her employment. Her main probl^TH yg,g
frthe_ability to get along with patients. CP#s job was to go to
^patient's homes and provide whatever'"^are was necessary. Many
//complaints were received about CP's attitude and way of handling
/2-these patients. She was counseled on several occasions. After
/7-CP's first counseling session with* Susan Morgan, CP stated that
CP persistently argued about the
yVSusan pointed out wrong things.
/^content of what Susan was trying to relate to CP.
When Ms.
/^Hollenbeck restated what Morgan had initially said, CP seemed to
^understand what had gone on and why she had been counseled* CP
/^never used the work "harassed" when speaking about her treatment by
/£Morgan* it was mostly about performance issues. Ms. Hollenbeck
^stated that Morgan was responsible for the highest risk patients
«2*. (IV), and errors could be life-threatening. Morgan had to address
^deficiencies to employees. Most employees, including CP, did not
^like to hear what Morgan said. Ms. Hollenbeck stated that she had
2^never personally observed anyone, including Morgan, harassing CP or
^anyone else. Ms. Hollenbeck only had second hand knowledge about
Xthe incidents leading up to CP's termination, but did state that
£7they could have been very serious.
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Memorandum
TOs
File
FROM:
SH
REs
T. Thompson vs Community Nursing Services
Charge No. 35C-94-0115
On August 19, 1994, during a telephone interview, Lona Booth (DOB
5-30-39), Weekend Supervisor and CP # s witness, stated the
following:
She said CF was a paradox - she had the appearance of a bag lady
and was fairly intellectual on the other hand.
From the very
start^jshe^had received many complaints about CP from patientg^and
pther stafl:, and had counseled CP on these complainfes. Except for
the complaints, CP did 'a good ioh* although she was one of R's
lesser qualified nurses.
CP had had minimum prior working
experience and only had an associate degree in nursing, while most
other nurses had bachelors degrees in nursing and many years of
experience. CP trang^rred to her weekend team in December 199L,
after CP had complained to her about her then supervisor, Susan
Morgan. CP's complaint had stemmed from a warning she had received
for poor job performance. CP did not use the work "harassment",
but did say that Ms. Morgan, did not treat her fairly.
After
talking to CP, Ms. Booth said that CP's main complaints were about
Ms. Morgan's style of supervision. Morgan was responsible for the
most critical ill patients and had to see that employees were
performing their duties, such as IV' s, properly.
She is an
assertive person who will confront any situation head-on, and
expects a great deal from her workers. She treats all employees
the same way, fair or not. At the end of their conversation, Ms.
Booth said that CP seemed to understand why she had received the
warning, but said that she did not like hearing it from Ms. Morgan.
Ms. Booth stated that no one else had complained about harassment
from anyone in the ten years she had been employed by the
Respondent, although she had heard employees grumble on occasion
about Susan Morgan being too strict and expected too much of
employees.
Regarding the last two incidents, Ms. Booth stated that they were
both potentially very dangerous situations which could have been
avoided. Regarding the second event, she stated that CP had gone
to a patients home and had found that the equipment was not working
properly.
She did not know how to fix what was wrong, and left
without calling for assistance. When Ms. Booth had found out what
had happened the next week, CP told her that a "big to-do11 was made
out of the situation, and that she (CP) refused to see any more IV
patients in the future.
Ms. Booth regarded this statement as
insubordination. No one else had ever done anything similar. CP
had also missed a mandatory training which would have given her the
expertise in repairing the equipment problem.
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Page 4
Response to Charge and Request for Information
Theresa F. Thompson, 35C940115
On or about December, 1991, Ms. Thompson submitted an internal
'application requesting she be^ considered for weeXend^d^xZIlSBZwas
accepLt^dc The position was regarded as full-time and was fully
benefited.
It stipulated that she be available to work every
Friday at 12 Noon through the following Monday at 12 noon. Skills
required of this position included proficiency in IV teaching and
administration, excellence in assessment skills, and organizational
skills to adequately coordinate delivery of care on the weekends.
Eventually, due to lack of need, Ms. Thompson only worked JSatjurday
ajld^Sunday. This was the shift she was working at the time of her
termination in March, 1993.
Proficiency in intravenous administration (IV) and teaching is
required of all weekend staff members. Our policy is that alLJUL.
team members must pass a yearly examination on IV therapy. The IV
Certification Pass-Off includes a written test, central line care,
blood draw from central line, types of IV lines, mock IV and use of
various IV equipment, such as Bard Infusion Pump, and TPN infusion.
Ms. Thompson participated in and passed the examination on May 15,
1991 and May 6, 1992c
Additional educational inservices were routinely provided on site
for professional development of Ms. Thompson and all other nurses
required to perform IV therapy, usually on a monthly basis. Some
of the inservices which were made available included:
Chemotherapy
Infusion of Pain Medications
TPN Update
Epidural Catheters

3-4-92
3-6-92
10-2-92
10-7-92

Ms. Thompson attended the first two inservices, but opted not to
attend the last two. In fact, one of the incidents for which Ms.
Thompson was discharged involved improper progrjyroming^f^
infusing TPN to a patient, an inservice which slie did not attend.
Ms. Thompson had a history of staff and patient complaints for
which she was counseled. Written counseling occurred on 5-3-91,
in which a patient requested that Ms. Thompson be taken off the
case, and 1-29-92 for a patient complaint that she caused a
"stressful" visit due to the way she set up a glucometer machine.
Performance reviews on 4-11-91 indicated Ms, Thompson needed to
"Increase knowledge of home health necessary in personal prac±jLc.eLy!_^.
8-20-92 indicated she needed to "increase, pg-qpgqmpni° glHll,^ and
—
a dmitpaperwo rk".
Verbal complaints from staff to Ms. Thompsonfs supervisors included
concern about her assessment skills and also regarding her
appearance, which was often dirty and unkempt.
One of her
supervisors, Susan Morgan, has record of verbal counseling for

Page 5
Response to Charge and Request for Information
Theresa F„ Thompson, 35C940115

DISCHARGE:
The decision to terminate Ms. Thompson's employment was reached
after careful review of the following:
Pyior work experience

Current jnh desnri pfci QJ\
CNS & H training specifically regarding IVs and TPN
CNS & H counseling history concerning staff and patient
complaints
Incident reports completed regarding two patients
on 3-13-93 and 3-14-93
The level of skill and judgment exercised on 3-13-93 and 3-14-93
was not appropriate and could have resulted in serious consequences
for those patients.
The first incident on 3-13-93 involved a blood draw from a man who
had an IV. Ms. Thompson drew the blood from an IV line which was
infusing the drug Heparin. The fact that Ms. Thompson would draw
blood from an IV line was extremely unusual in the first place. An
excerpt from the CNS & H IV Certification Outline which Ms.
Thompson read and passed specifically states, "Blood draws from an
IV line are not recommended. . .PT and PTT's should not be drawn from
a line". Because traces of the drug were still in the line, the
blood sample readings turned out to be very strange. The concerned
physician ordered this home bound patient to go to the emergency
room for a blood draw, where the blood tests proved to be normal.
While not lif e-threatening^ this event caused considerab le
inconvenience for the patJLent.
Additionally, the patient's
physician was so angry over the error that he assigned the patient
to another home health agency. To this day, he refuse^ to refer
his patients to CNS & H^_
The second, and most serious incident involved a woman who had
several health problems, including pancreatitis.
One of the
treatments for her condition involved giving her Total Parental
Nutrition (TPN) intravenously through a pancreatic pump. No other
nutrients are given. It is important to understand that if the
pump was not programmed correctly, the infusion of nutrients could
stop abruptly causing her blood sugar to drop dramatically, leaving
her vulnerable to a hypoglycemic incident. The patient could have
slipped into a coma and died.
Ms. Thompson had seen the
patient on 3-13-93, and had noted on_th^
chart that the patientfs blood sugar was low and unstable.^ The
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Also Mr. O'Brien, being a lawyer, would have recognized the Tort of
Outrage for what it was inspite of the fact that it was not properly named by
Plaintiff.

He refused to quote it, and always insisted it tried to create

a defamation liability, (page 38, 88, 120, 136)

Plaintiff contends that this

effort to mislead the Court is a violation of Rules of Professional Conduct
3o3 (a 1, 4)
Mr. O'Brien's first attempt to subvert the Plaintiff's charges and mislead the judge in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (a 1, 4) and
Section 78-51-26(4) (Duties of Attorneys and Counselors) was in Motion to
Dismiss/and or for Summary Judgment (page 37), quote:

The basis for this

Motion is that Plaintiff seeks to assert a defamation claim for statements
made..."

He further subverted the claim in the Memorandum—quote:

pro se Complaint

"Plaintiff's

(undated and Amended Complaint (dated 10/19/94) expressly

assert that Plaintiff was defamed by statements allegedly made by CNS/H..."
(page 38)
The Amended Complaint added to the Pro Se Complaint a charge that Plaintiff
had been defamed by Defendant.

However, the Plaintiff's pro se Complaint

did not assert that Plaintiff had been defamed by statements made by Defendant
but did expressly charge severe emotional and physical harm caused by false
testimony ( a violation of Utah Code Ann.Sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503, and 76-8-504)
(page 38)
Defendant's lawyer continues the deception on page 2 of Memorandum—quote:
"Plaintiff plainly seeks to impose defamation liability..." (page 39) and
he clearly ignores the charge of severe emotional and physical harm.
Plaintiff at this time was still under the impression that the lawyer
also meant false testimony by 'defamation'.
Mr. O'Brien, in using absolute privilege as a defense, deliberately
eliminated that portion of the definition of absolute privilege (Black's

40

Law Dictionary)

that says —quote:

"(absolute) privilege...protects the

speaker or publisher without reference to his motives or the truth or falsity
of

statement.

This may be claimed in respect to statements made in legis-

lative debates, in reports of military officers to their superiors in the line
of duty, and statements made by judges, witnesses, and jurors in trials in
court.

(It does not cover the litigants.)...based on the fact that the state-

ment was made in the performance of a political, judicial, social or personal
duty...privileges created by law irrespective of consent...arise where there
is some important and overriding social value in sanctioning defendant's
conduct, despite the fact that it causes plaintiff harm."

By not reavealing

this information to the Court, Defendant's lawyer was in violation of Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (a 2 ) . There was no overriding social value
in the false testimony presented by Defendant nor was the false testimony
given as a matter of duty.

It was totally self-serving and meant to manipu-

late a federal commission in the line of its duty.
promote public welfare in any way.

The statement did not

If CNS/H goes out of business, there are

other home nursing agencies to fill the void.
By definition absolute privilege protects statements made in judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings in the line of duty and have an overriding
social value from libel liability.

However, Mr. O'Brien deceitfully led

Court to believe absolute privilege also protected from harm caused by the
false testimony and criminal charges, (page 135-136)
Mr. O'Brien further attempted to mislead the Court about
of the EEOC investigation.

the main issue

The lawyer claimed that the main issue was Plain-

tiff's termination of employment (page 42) which it was not.

The main issue

was a two-year history of harrassment and retaliation, (pages 67-73).
When Mr. O'Brien finally accepted the fact that there was itideed a tort
of outrage,

he insisted that it was created around the end of December, (page 136)
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when in fact it was the Original Complaint (page 2). His defense again attempted to deceive the Court into believing that the Tort was really only an
attempt "to impose liability for absolutely privileged statements." (page 136)
and that the stress was created by termination of employment which is not considered outrageous, (page 137). In the Pro Se Complaint it clearly states
that the stress that hospitalized the Plaintiff was caused by false testimony
which Plaintiff learned about nearly a year and a half after termination of
employment.

Deliberately presenting false testimony to a federal commission

in the performance of its duty to manipulate a decision is outrageous conduct.
Mr. O'Brien consistently and persistantly used arguments that were aimed
at deceiving and misleading the judge. He consistantly used partial defi'nitions, conpared judicial proceeding to the EEOC proceeding (there is no
comparison.

Plaintiff filed the charge with EEOC but was not required to send

a copy to the Defendant.

Plaintiff did not hear from the EEOC again for eight

months when the investigator was ready to make a decision.
able to get a

Plaintiff was un-

copy of Defendant's response until and for the exclusive use

of a Civil suit.

There are no procedural rules or mechanism in place to insure

a fair and just determination.
Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to find Mr. O'Brien guilty of
professional misconduct, guilty of violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-31Plaintiff holds Mr. O'Brien and his employers (JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH) equally responsible for my month of severe physical and mental
harm and ask $36,000,000 (thirty-six million dollars)

in relief.

*********************************************

4.

Argument in support of misconduct of Judge Frederick.
Code of Judicial Conduct.

Canon 2 A. A judge shall respect and comply

with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in
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in the integrity and impartiality of judiciary.
Canon 3.B (4)

A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to

litigants...
Canon 3. B (5)
prejudice.

A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or

A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties,

by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudece...A judge should be alert to
behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial.
Canon 3.

B (7)

A judge shall accord to every person who is legally

interested in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard
according to law.
Canon 3. B (8)

A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly,

efficiently, and fairly.
Attached are two affidavits attesting to violation by Judge Frederick
of the above mentioned Canons.
Plaintiff further charges that Judge J. Dennis Frederick violated Canon 3
B (5) when he issued a minute order granting Defendant's request to deny
Plaintiff's Post-judgment orders.

The request was two days late.

Judge

Frederick granted the request before Plaintiff even had a copy of it.
also signed the order before Plaintiff had filed her reply.
Request was filed January 11, 1995;
was signed the 13th.

He

Defendant's

Minute Entry was made the 12th; Order

Plaintiff Objected to judge's hasty decision on 13th.

Judge set aside the minute entry of the 12th—stated he Misunderstood Defendant's
argument*
arguments.

0*i January 26, 1995 he found in Defendant's favor based on Defendant's
Between January 11, 1995 (Defendant's arguments misunderstood by

judge) and January 26, 1995 there were no new arguments presented by Defendant.
The judge's decision on January 26, 1995 were based on the same arguments that
he claimed to have misunderstood on January 18, 1995! (p a 8 e

13

4 , 141» 143, 148,

149, 150, 154).
Plaintiff charges that Judge Frederick never read any of Plaintiff's

A O

charges or arguments and his attitude towards Plaintiff was a violation of
Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Supreme Court investigate this
matter and take appropriate action.
*******************************************************
*******************************************************

10.

Relief sought:

An equitable decision about the EEOC that will

prevent future situations like the one Plaintiff found herself in, and
$12,000,000 from the Defendant for the severe harm they caused to Plaintiff
by their flagrant violation of the law.

Plaintiff also asks $36,000,000 from

JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K AND McDONOUGH Law Firm for their involvement in the
harm caused to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also asks that a decision or clarificatio
be made giving precedence to Constitutional law and statuatory law over
common law when there, is a conflict between the two.

Plaintiff further

asks $2,000,000 for the harm caused to Plaintiff's reputation by the
Defendant's false testimony- Plaintiff requests all legal fees and damages
paid by Defendant.
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PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELF
BOX 786
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329
NO PHONE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THERESA F. THOMPSON,
AFFIDAVIT AFFIRMING OPENING STATEMENT
BY DEFENDANT'S LAWYER AND GENERAL ATTITUDE OF COURT

Plaintiff,
vs.

TO BE FILED WITH CIVIL CASE

COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 940906495 CV
Appellate No. 950102

I, William M. Thompson, being over 21 years of age and of sound mind
and body, do solemnly affirm that the following statement is a true and
accurate account of what transpired at the court hearing on December 12, 1994
between Theresa F. Thompson (my mother) and Community Nursing Service/Hospice:
I was'sitting towards the back of the courtroom.

Mr. O'Brien (defendant's

lawyer), as he approached the podium, said that they did not contest the charge's
but could not be held accountable for them and gave his argument.
remember his exact words.

I do not

I have read the transcript of Mr. O'Brien's statement

and it does not agree with what I heard.

Since I was farther from Mr. O'Brien

than either the judge or the recorder, it is assumed that they also heard what
I heard.
During the entire time Mrs. Thompson was talking, Judge Frederick sat
tapping a pen or pencil on his table, flipping papers and occasionally writing.
He seldom looked in Mrs. Thompson direction and I got the impression he was
totally bored by the whole proceeding, also that he had made up his mind about
the case before the hearing had ever started.
After the hearing I told Mrs. Thompson that from what I had observed not

1

to be surprised if Mr. O'Brien's opening statement did not appear in the
transcript of if Judge Frederick found against her.

I also told her that if

she wanted or needed, I would testify in court as to what I had seen and heard,
She didn't think that would be necessary.

She really believed that because

Mr. O'Brien had said what he did, that it would appear in the transcript.

She

also believed that if she lost the case, it would be because she had presented
her case badly, not because of bias on the part of the judge.
I was there as a witness to whatever transpired, but also to try and
prevent whatever might transpire from causing my mother so much stress that
she wound up in the hospital again.

My mother finally realized that this

testimony was necessary when she tried to have the transcript corrected and
the judge refused to have it corrected even when Mr. O'Brien did not deny
saying it.

His only argument was that Mrs. Thompson misunderstood him.

I

did not misunderstand him, and neither did Mrs. Thompson.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THERESA F. THOMPSON,

AFFIDAVIT AFFIRMING OPENING STATEMENT
OF DEFENDANT'S LAWYER AND GENERAL ATTITUDE OF COURT

Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE,

TO BE FILED WITH CIVIL CASE
Civil No. 940906495 CV

Defendant.

Appellate No. 950102

I, Theresa F. Thompson, being over 21 years of age and of sound mind
and body, do solemnly affirm that the following statement is a true and
accurate account of what transpired at the court hearing on December 12, 1994
between Theresa F. Thompson and Community Nursing Service/Hospice:
I was sitting alone at the Plaintiff's table.

Mr. O'Brien, Defendant's

lawyer, arose from his seat and approached the podium.

As he walked to the

podium, he quietly said, "We do not contest the charges.

We admit them."

He placed his papers on the podium and proceeded to read from them his argument
as to why CNS/H should not be held accountable for its actions.
After Mr. O'Brien completed his argument and sat down, I went to the
podium to give my argument as to why CNS/H should be held accountable for
their actions.

I looked at the judge and he was sorting through some papers

that were on his desk.

I thought it was my responsibility to get his attention.

I started to talk but was already confused and realing under the Defendant's
admission of guilt.

I looked up at the judge again and he was tapping a pen

on his desk, but he was looking towards me.
more and more flustered.

I continued talking, but getting

He looked away and I knew I had lost his attention.
1

Throughout the balance of my argument the judge seemed to be occupied
with his papers and pen.

I sensed impatience from him and felt it was because

of my poor presentation which got worse by the minute as I became more and
more frustrated.

Finally at the end of the hearing after the Defendant had

made their final statement, 1 asked the judge if I could present some other
evidence that had not been brought out in any previous written statement*
didn't know what could or couldn't be used as evidence.)
"Is it going to take long?"

(I

The judge asked,

I said no, and hurried through the presentation.

I did not know until after I filed the appeal with the Supreme Court and
continued my research in the Utah Codes that the judge's attitude towards me
was a violation of the Code of Judicial Administration (Canons 1 and 3).
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